General Employment Law - Federal Court
Lavin v. Trezza et al.
__F.Supp.__ 01/15/2002
KRAVCHUK
Plaintiff's claims against coworkers dismissed as Maine District Court follows holding that Americans With Disabilities Act does not permit lawsuits against individuals. Defamation claim against employer for emotional damages dismissed as covered by Workers' Compensation Act, but economic damage claim allowed to proceed to trial.
The plaintiff, a UNUM employee, was terminated based on the complaints of several coworkers that he gave them inappropriate looks and engaged in other inappropriate conduct. The plaintiff claimed that he had a disability which required medication that at times made him seem to be staring at other people.
The company refused to make accommodations, but instead increased the plaintiff's workload, thus exacerbating his stress. It also forced him to forfeit a week of paid vacation at termination, which it did not require of other departing employees. While the plaintiff was jobhunting, one potential employer rejected him on the basis it had heard through the grapevine that he had been terminated for sexual harassment.
The plaintiff then filed a pro se suit against the employer and several coworkers under the Americans With Disabilities Act for failure to provide reasonable accommodations. He also sued for defamation and malicious and wrongful termination. The defendants moved to dismiss the suit.
The Court dismissed plaintiff's defamation claim to the extent it sought damages for emotional distress, as barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act. It allowed the claim for economic damages to proceed, however, as not covered by the Act. The Court then dismissed the plaintiff's claims against his coworkers, as the Maine Federal District Court and the majority of federal courts hold that the ADA does not permit lawsuits against individuals. The Court did allow the plaintiff's ADA claim against UNUM itself to go to trial, however.
Green v. New Balance
Athletic Shoe, Inc.
__F.Supp.__ 01/29/2002
SINGAL
Employee's pregnancy discrimination claims against employer partly dismissed and partly upheld based on evidence of disparate treatment.
Employers may fill the positions of employees on family and medical leave as long as they reinstate the employee to an equivalent position in terms of pay and benefits.
Under the Family and Medical Leave Act, the employer may require the employee to work reduced hours as the FMLA does not include a reasonable accommodation provision.
The Court partly granted and partly denied the employer's motion to dismiss the employee's claims of pregnancy discrimination under the Family and Medical Leave Act, the Maine and Federal Pregnancy Acts, and the Maine Whistleblowers' Acts.
The employee was working as a floor person moving heavy boxes when she informed her employer in winter 1999 that she was pregnant and her doctor restricted her lifting. Her supervisor told her to bid for a new position within the company and that haste was essential because the employer could not accommodate her pregnancy "down the road." Under pressure, she transferred to the assembly line. In April 1999 she was granted a medical leave of absence. She tried to return to work in June but could not do heavy lifting. The employer had filled her old job and said no suitable jobs were available. According to the employee, human resources said the employer would not accommodate her. The employer then offered her a part-time job at reduced pay, but it refused to grant her requests for accommodation, including a stool to sit on and a personal fan. She worked on a reduced leave schedule, but when her family leave expired in July, the employer refused to grant her maternity leave and instead terminated her in August. The employee then filed complaints under the FMLA, Pregnancy Acts, and Maine WPA.
On the PDA claims, the Court noted that in 1991 Title VII was amended to include pregnancy discrimination claims for disparate treatment or impact against pregnant employees. An employee claiming disparate treatment, as here, must prove that the employer purposely took adverse action against the employee based on her pregnancy. If there is no direct evidence, the employee must use the McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting test.
The Court granted partial summary judgment to the employer, finding that the employee failed to show that the employer had treated her any differently than it had treated other employees returning from medical leave, as it did not grant them such accommodations as the employee requested.
However, the Court did find evidence of discriminatory animus where (i) the employee endured a reduced wage while in training for the job to which she was transferred and (ii) the employer failed to adjust the height of her work station on the basis that she was pregnant and would not be working there much longer. The Court allowed these issues to go to trial.
On the Family and Medical Leave Act claim, the Court noted that employers may fill the positions of employees on medical leave, as long as they reinstate the employee to an equivalent position in terms of pay or benefits. The Court found it a question of fact, not amenable to summary judgment, whether the employee's reduced incentives while training meant that she had not been offered an equivalent position. The Court also refused to dismiss the employee's claim that she was temporarily fired when she was told that the employer would not accommodate her "down the road." The Court found this raised a question of discriminatory animus against the employee based on her pregnancy.
The Court also found, however, that the employer could require the employee to work reduced hours where she could not work full-time, as the FMLA does not include a reasonable accommodation provision. Moreover, even if the employer allows more than the FMLA-required 12 weeks of leave, the FMLA does not provide a cause of action against the employer for failing to provide the extra amount of time to a particular employee. The Court added that an employer may not require an employee to take more leave than she desires under the FMLA.
As far as the reduced leave, the Court held that the employer has the right to count the employee's reduced leave days against her FMLA leave as long as it gives her the required two-day notice that it will do so. Furthermore, an employee on reduced leave must be given equivalent pay and benefits, but not equivalent duties until she returns to work full-time. The plaintiff also had no remedy for her discharge because the employer could fire her once she refused to return after her leave expired.
Finally, the Court dismissed the plaintiff's claim of retaliation under the Whistleblowers' Protection Act for lack of sufficient evidence. As the Court noted, where the employer encouraged the employee to take leave, there was no evidence that it intended to discriminate against her for taking that leave. Moreover, the employer reinstated her once she informed it that her firing was illegal.
